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Abstract
This article describes the demographic changes and their social and economic 
implications and challenges that will confront Indonesia in the future. I calculate 
trends in the proportion of old age population and review the relevant literature 
to make some observations about the implications of such changes. The 
conclusions I make are important for further conceptual elaboration and 
empirical analysis. Based on the population data and projections from the 
Indonesian Central Agency of Statistics, National Planning Agency, other 
relevant sources, I find that Indonesia is now entering the important phase of 
demographic transition in which a window of opportunity prevails and where 
saving rate can be increased. I conclude that it is now time for Indonesia to 
prepare a new social policy in the form of overall welfare provision that should 
include healthcare and pension for every Indonesian citizen.
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1. Introduction
Demographic change, mainly characterized by a decreasing long-term trend 
in the proportion of productive aged population and increasing proportion of aging 
population, is becoming increasingly more important in public decision making.  A 
continuing fall in the birth and mortality rates changes the age structure of the 
population. Its effects are wide-ranging, from changes in national saving rates 
and current account balances, as seen in major advanced countries (Kim and Lee, 
2008) to a shift from land-based production and stagnant standards of living to 
sustained income growth as birth rates become low (Bar and Leukhina, 2010). 
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The demographic transition also contributes to cross-country differences in 
economic growth (Bloom and Finlay, 2009) and there will, therefore, be a need for 
a new policy to offset its potential negative effects. Demographic changes, 
accompanied by a decline in the labor force, will also have a major impact on 
voting structures, savings rates, and social security systems (Komine and Kabe, 
2009). There are also social and political implications such as inequalities, 
migration, social policy, and international security (Inoguchi, 2009) .
Komine and Kabe, 2009 show that the demographic structure of Asia is 
expected to change rapidly from around 2020 up to around 2050, at different 
stages in different countries. Japan is already at an advanced stage, followed by 
China, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore, and also ASEAN countries. 
Indonesia without exception is in the midst of a demographic transition, which 
will have social and economic effects in the future. One very important 
consequence of it is a necessity for a social as well as economic policy change. 
Thus far, there have been few discussions about how the demographic change is 
linked with the need for a new social policy, especially in the Indonesian context.
This article reviews the development of demographic changes in Indonesia 
and their related issues as described in the literature and the ongoing discussions 
about new initiatives for setting up a new welfare system for the Indonesian 
people. 
2. Indonesian Demographic changes and their consequences
2.1. Demographic changes
In 2010, the Indonesian population has reached 234 million, with the average 
growth rate of 1.2 percent per year. As is the case in other developing countries, 
Indonesia is entering the second wave of demographic transition towards a lower 
fertility rate and a lower mortality rate. Indonesians are now living longer, as 
indicated by a rise in life expectancy at birth  from 67.1 in 2000 to an estimate of 
70.8 in 2010 and 73.3 in 2025 (BPS, BAPPENAS,UNFPA). In addition, the 
percentage of working-age population shows an increasing trend, and at the same 
time the dependency ratio is declining, especially due to a lower percentage of 
young population aged 0-14. Both of these trends imply the changing age 
structure of the population, but on the other hand provide windows of opportunity 
for Indonesia, in which the decline in the share of the young aged population and 
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the increase in the share of the productive prime working aged population 
(15-64) １） provide opportunities for a high rate of economic growth and 
preparation for future consequences of demographic changes.  Based on cross-
country analysis, the study by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) has shown that age 
share of the income and consumption variables have substantial effects on per-
worker GDP growth rates. Many other studies, e.g. Andersson (2001) and Bloom 
and Finlay (2009) have also observed a positive impact on economic growth by the 
share of middle- or working aged adult population. 
The demographic changes in Indonesia are occurring at a fast rate (Ananta 
and Arifin, 2008) and, therefore, would require adjustments to national policies, 
including a new social policy. Thus far little attempt has been made to push for 
such a policy. As demographic changes will shape the future of Indonesia, there is 
a need for a shift from business as usual to a new policy. The fertility rate in 
Indonesia is currently below replacement level２）, hence, population aging.  One of 
the effects has been the change in behavior toward a higher degree of 
individualism and increasing demand for a more democratic society. The changed 
age structure of the Indonesian population is also one important factor that may 
cause lower potential saving. 
The experience of many countries suggests that substantial demographic 
changes have occurred in the past few decades. In OECD countries, improvements 
in life standards, health care, and nutrition have increased life expectancy 
(Navaneetham, 2002). For Asian countries, Bloom and Finlay (2008) have 
calculated the contribution of demographic change to economic growth over the 
period 1965-2005. They show that 41.73 percent of the economic growth of 
Indonesia during the period 1965-2005 is explained by the growth of working-age 
share of population. 
Figures 1 and 2 show how demographic transition in Indonesia has occurred 
from 2005 to 2010 and Figures 3 to 5 show how further transition will take place 
in the future. In 2005, Indonesian population was relatively young; with a 
dominant proportion of economically-productive population aged between 15 and 
64, whereas the old-age population was small in proportion. Although the young 
aged population group (0-9) is getting smaller as compared with the situation in 
1971 (see Ananta and Arifin, 2008), the burden to the working-aged population is 
still high. Nevertheless, due to still high mortality rate at each group the pyramid 
becomes skewed towards its summit. 
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Figure 1.  Indonesian Population Pyramid 2005  (in thousand)
Source : Calculation based on BPS, Bappenas, UNFPA Indonesian population projection 2000-2025
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Figure 2.  Indonesian Population Pyramid 2010 (in thousand)
Source : Calculation based on BPS, Bappenas, UNFPA Indonesian population projection 2000-2025
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Figure 3.  Indonesian Population Pyramid 2015 (in thousand)
Source : Calculation based on BPS, Bappenas, UNFPA Indonesian population projection 2000-2025
23
Demographic Changes in Indonesia and the Demand for a New Social Policy
15000 10000 5000 0 5000 10000 15000
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
Female Male
Figure 4.  Indonesian Population Pyramid 2020 (in thousand)
Source : Calculation based on BPS, Bappenas, UNFPA Indonesian population projection 2000-2025
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Figure 5.  Indonesian Population Pyramid 2025 (in thousand)
Source : Calculation based on BPS, Bappenas, UNFPA Indonesian population projection 2000-2025 
One important implication of this is a high dependency ratio. The population 
pyramid in Figures 2 through 5 show that from 2010 to 2025 the population 
pyramid is changing and takes a shape where the middle-age working population 
becomes dominant, and hence lowering the dependency ratio. In this period, the 
percentage of young population is lower and that of old-age begins rising. This is a 
period in which saving rate can be increased from the working age population. 
Therefore, this period begins to provide a demographic window of opportunity 
(this will be discussed further below). However, this will not last very long. At this 
stage of demographic transition, the proportion of old age (60 and above) 
population becomes greater. Because of a further decline in the fertility rate and 
longer life expectancy at birth the old age population rises in proportion. An 
increasingly aging population in 2025 will lead to higher dependency ratio again, 
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or precisely higher old-age dependency ratio. Figure 6 further shows an 
increasingly greater proportion of old age population. Consequently, Indonesia 
would have around 25 years of window of opportunity left that is only one long-
term planning cycle. 
Figure 6 shows that by 2025 the proportion of older people aged 60 and above 
in Indonesia will become 12.8 percent and will rise to 22.4 percent in 2050, which 
resembles more or less the condition in the developed countries in 1950 (see 
Mohan, 2004). Meanwhile, Figure 7 shows that the proportion of young people 
will decline to 23 percent in 2025 and around 20 percent in 2050; more or less the 
condition in developed countries in 2000 (see Mohan, 2004). The rising old-age 
population share will override the declining young-age share, and as a result the 
overall dependency ratio (see Figure 8) will rise, and more old-age population will 
depend on working-age population. 
However, in 2025 around a quarter of total population will still be young-
aged, with an increasingly large proportion of old age prevailing. The old-age 
dependency ratio３） will, as Figure 9 shows, rise from 7.5 in 2000 to 12.2 percent 
in 2025 to almost 26 percent in 2050.
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Figure 6.  Trends in proportion of older population
Source : Converted to graph based on data from Mohan (2002)
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Figure 7.  Trends in proportion of young population of Indonesia
Source : Converted to graph based on data from Mohan (2002)
1975 2000 2025 2050
% 5.3 7.6 12.8 22.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
%
Figure 8.  Trends in dependency ratio of Indonesian population
Source : (National Agency for Family Planning Coordination, 2009)
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Figure 9.  Trends in dependency ratio of Indonesian old population
Source : Converted to graph based on data from Mohan (2002)
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2.2. Window of opportunity
According to Ananta; Arifin and Bakhtiar, 2005, Indonesia reached 
replacement level of fertility in 2000-2005, finishing the first demographic 
transition. They predict that Indonesia will enter the era of low potential saving 
again after around 2035. In between, from 2005-2035, Indonesia will experience a 
favorable age structure of population, with a relatively small total dependency 
ratio̶the young dependency ratio is declining fast and yet the old dependency 
ratio has not been rising rapidly. This favorable era is often called as the 
“demographic window of opportunity” . The period of 2005-2035 is the 
demographic window of opportunity in Indonesia, because this is the time when 
Indonesia will not be severely burdened with financing the dependent population. 
The periods during which the window of opportunity occurs vary across 
countries, depending on the pace at which fertility and mortality decline. Table 1 
shows Indonesia’s window of opportunity as compared with other neighboring 
countries.４） Some countries have benefited from windows of opportunities, while 
some others have not. Navaneetham (2002) indicates that countries that have had 
open economies and had excellent human capital benefited more from the 
“window of opportunity”. Unfortunately, Indonesia is not yet at this stage.
Table 1.  Period of window of opportunity in selected countries
Country Window of 
opportunity
Indonesia 1975-2025
Malaysia 1970-2020
Philippines 1970-2030
Singapore 1970-2015
Thailand 1975-2015
Source: (Navaneetham, 2002)
Indonesia has not invested enough in human capital, especially education 
and health. This, at least, is shown by the fact that Indonesia’s education public 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP is only 3.8,  as compared with Malaysia (8.1) 
and Thailand (4.6), although a little higher than the Philippines. Also, Indonesia 
has a relatively small share of the government spending as measured by a 
relative small percentage of total expenditures of GDP (Granado, Fengler, Ragatz, 
and Yavuz, 2007). World Bank (2008) has also shown that Indonesia still spends 
comparatively little on health. In total, Indonesia spends less than 3 percent of 
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GDP on the health sector. In contrast, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
most of Indonesia’s other neighboring countries spend more and score better on 
most conventional measures of health outcomes, such as DPT and measles 
vaccinations, as well as on child and maternal mortality rates. 
Moreover, more than half of public health spending in Indonesia was carried 
out by provinces and districts. Despite substantial increases in public spending, 
private health spending still comprises the bulk of total health expenditures. 
About 65 percent of all spending on health is private and, of that, 75 percent is 
direct out-of-pocket spending. The remaining private spending from companies 
and insurance funds is limited.
2.3. The implications
The high dependency ratios of both old-age and young-age have significant 
impacts on the government expenditures as well as the macroeconomy of 
Indonesia. First, the government will have to spend more on social security, 
health care and other welfare programs for the elderly. To finance these 
expenditures, the government will have to raise higher tax revenues from the 
working-age population, thereby creating contractionary effects on the economy. 
Saving rate may decline and the capacity to grow becomes less. As more income is 
taken from young working generation and given to the old generation, this will be 
one of the principal challenges confronting the Indonesian government in the 
future, particularly, in the context of intergenerational equity as is faced by many 
developed nations today.５） 
Second, even if the Indonesia government is not paying for the old people nor 
does it have social security system in place, the young generation will pay for 
their parents ’ health as in most cases in Asia in which the government 
involvement in the pension system is very much limited.６） In such a situation, as 
the old aged people (65+) are mostly retired, they depend on their children for 
their consumption needs, including health. The working age group also spends a 
high percentage of their income on bearing and rearing their children. ７） 
Therefore, high private spending reduces the capacity to save, and thereby 
reducing growth capacity.８） When the burden is increasing, there will a demand 
for a shift from private to public provision of healthcare in the future. There will 
be an increasing demand for state-managed healthcare and pensions. Higher 
government expenditure will also be required as the effect of the aging population 
if the government will respond to this by expanding medical care insurance and 
pension coverage. 
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Third, the rise in dependency ratios combined with falling fertility rate may 
also have an impact on female participation in the workforce. Declining sex ratio 
indicates that, in general, more women enter the labor market, thereby increasing 
the supply of labor. On the one hand, this would result in higher economic growth, 
but on the other hand, it would require a different working condition conducive to 
working women. Besides, the demand for higher women rights in the workplace 
and society in general will be stronger.
Fourth, as in most of the developing countries in Asia, Indonesia is in the 
middle path of demographic transition, with a still large portion of working-age 
population. But this demographic dividend will not last very long because the 
Indonesian population will become older. However, with still high rates of 
unemployment and poverty (low income of most working age population) and 
stressed budget, it will be least likely that the government will, in the short 
future, have the policy to take care for the elderly until unemployment and 
poverty rates are reduced to substantially low level.
Fifth, as a result of better education and healthcare, life expectancy at birth 
rises and it is higher for females. In 2010 it is estimated at 70.8９） and by 2025-30 
it will rise to around 74 and becomes 77 in 2045-50.10） Consequently, the longer 
life would again require better education and healthcare, and therefore, the 
demand for higher provision for these two public services will be high. 
Sixth, because the level of benefit that can be gained from the “window of 
opportunity” is very closely related to human capital, Indonesia will be confronted 
with the challenge of providing better human capital as opposed to physical 
capital. There will be a high demand for quality education and healthcare, for 
which a greater role of government involvement will be needed. 
2.4. The need for a new social policy
As Indonesia is gradually entering the third stage in the demographic 
transition, a new social policy to provide better social services and welfare to its 
people is increasingly demanded. A new policy and administration of social 
services and welfare should include policies for education, health, pensions, and 
social security. Other related policies would also include the provision of public 
facilities and services for the elderly people. In an even broader perspective, a new 
social policy is also needed to address issues of ways to promote welfare, and 
means to improve the general social and economic conditions of the nation. 
“The 2009 Healthcare Law and the 2004 National Social Security System 
Law stipulate that the government shall plan, regulate and organize healthcare 
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programs for all citizens, including the poor and the unemployed, particularly for 
service in public facilities. The passing of these laws, however, have not yet 
secured healthcare protection for Indonesian citizens. Healthcare insurance for 
the poor does not cover all poor people.” (Wisnu, 2010).  At present, only about 27 
percent of the population is covered by one of the current schemes, according to 
Susenas data. The social health insurance scheme for private sector workers, 
Jamsostek11）, suffers from its opt-out policy and covers only a small fraction of the 
intended target population (World Bank, 2008). Despite the advent of Askeskin12）, 
health insurance participation remains low, but has started to rise significantly. 
By mid-2005 as many as 85.9 million individuals (approx. 41 % of population) are 
covered by insurance, based on full coverage of 60 million people through 
Askeskin (World Bank, 2008). At the regional level, there has not been a health 
insurance system13） that covers all individuals. In fact, the revenues appropriated, 
for example, from local government-provided health services are not spent back 
on health services. “Fees from health center services made a significant 
contribution to local government revenues, but the expenditures that they 
financed went mainly to other activities such as public works “ (Achmad, 1999). 
However, there has recently been the advent of a new system by which a public 
services agency, BLU14）, is established to enable a public service provider like a 
hospital to generate their own revenues and spend them at their discretion. In 
that way it is expected public services will be improved. However, it will take a 
few years until such system proves to be a better one.
The employer-based insurance system like Jamsostek is limited to the formal 
sector only15）, whereas most low-income workers earn their living in the informal 
sector. There is still a worry that the new system will be a burden to the already 
stressed government budget if a major portion of its financing has to be incurred 
by the government, while a large contribution by workers can not be expected and 
perhaps not yet politically accepted. This may be because it would mean higher 
taxes (payroll taxes), and thereby reducing consumption level. Furthermore, the 
budget is competed against other programs such as overcoming unemployment 
and eradicating poverty. If it is managed as a separate fund rather than in the 
government budget, the challenge would be the complexity of administering it. 
There is certainly an increasing demand for a new and across-the-board 
healthcare system. The risk of exposure to illness is rising due to the wider spread 
of communicable diseases, and the costs of healthcare are increasing due to the 
prevalence of expensive-to-cure illness. The government should have a plan and 
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system to provide healthcare to all Indonesians (formal, informal, and self-
employed), including the medically-indigent sector of society. There is now a need 
for an inclusive and universal social security system. The universal social security 
system should include the need for an inclusive pension system, mandatory to 
both employers and employees. This is a real need because the vast majority of 
Indonesians has no pension provisions at all, and relies on the extended family for 
support in old age. There is no unified program that provides pension for 
Indonesian citizens16）. The new system’s coverage needs to be expanded so that it 
provides protection to everybody, not limited to formal sector workers only. 
Labor unions, NGOs, student groups and mass organizations have expressed 
a strong demand for the implementation of the wide-covering national social 
security system17）. However, the implementing body of the social security system 
is not yet created. PT Askes and PT Jamsostek have debated over who deserves to 
be the social security agency for a national program.18） The implementation of the 
2004 Law on the Social Security System (SJSN), which stipulates the need to 
create a regulating institute called the Social Insurance Management Agency 
(BPJS), is long overdue and there does not seem to be a big step or breakthrough 
in solving this problem. 
In spite of the difficulties, a national security system must, sooner or later, be 
set up before it is too late. Significant steps have to be taken to provide social 
protection for all citizens, particularly those who are now at their working age 
and who will become old and dependent in the future. It is now time for the 
Indonesian nation to build up social solidarity through a universal social security 
system.19）
3. Concluding remarks
Whether Indonesia will succeed to take full benefit from the windows of 
opportunity will depend on whether the Indonesian government is making efforts 
to shift to a new social policy. In the future, there will be a greater challenge for a 
big country like Indonesia to become a welfare state.  A universal social security 
system will certainly be one most important part of it. Big steps have yet to be 
made. 
The government should make progressive efforts to campaign and build up 
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social solidarity. In addition, a strong political will from lawmakers is required. 
Politicians and policy makers in the government should seriously develop a plan 
for a long term strategy for an overall welfare provision and for that purpose a 
timeline should be provided. 
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Endnotes
１）Lindh and Malmberg (1999 in K. Navaneetham, 2002)  have classified the age distribution 
as 0-14 (young), 15-24 (youth), 25-49 (prime working), 50-64 (middle) and 65+ (old age) for 
studying the impact on economic growth.
２）Replacement level of fertility is usually reached when TFR (total fertility rate) is about 2.2 
and IMR (infant mortality rate) is less than 30 per 1,000 live births.
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３）The old age dependency ratio is defined as the number of persons 65 years and over per 100 
persons 15 to 64 years (see Mohan, 2004).
４）Please note that the window of opportunity period for Indonesia here is different from 
Ananta and Arifin’s prediction due to different methodologies.
５）“In the Asian context, this issue is of great relevance as ageing is occurring at lower income 
levels. The redistribution of resources from younger to older generations has to be concerned 
with the incentive for savings, keeping in view the need for higher investment in sustaining 
the growth process.” (Mohan, 2004).
６）Pension systems are usually restricted to large enterprises in the formal sector, most 
managed by public enterprises (e.g. Jamsostek) and in the form of provident funds. There is 
no share from the central government budget. The overall public pension coverage of the 
labor force is limited. The provision of pensions and care for the old was essentially privately 
provided and usually within the family. In the informal sector, there is essentially no 
retirement age. 
７）The productive age share 25-49 contributed negatively to the per capita GDP growth rate in 
Indonesia. The earnings of this age group are mostly consumed in bearing and rearing 
children, and therefore the effect on the economic growth by this population would be 
minimal (Navaneetham, 2002).
８）This argument by Feldstein (1977) that the provision of social security, particularly public 
pensions, reduces the inducement to save thereby having a damaging impact on a country’s 
long-term growth prospects has been countered by Barro (1978) with his theory of 
multigenerational planning horizon in which he assumes that people make bequests and 
derive some benefit from the well being of future generations. Therefore, they would save 
more in order to increase their bequest sufficiently to compensate successive generations for 
their tax liabilities. These two effects should cancel each other leaving the savings rate 
unchanged. However, for the case of a country with low to medium income and high average 
propensity to consume, saving rate will remain low.
９）Proyeksi Penduduk 2000-2025, http://www.datastatistik-indonesia.com, downloaded on 28 
May 2010.
10）Mohan (2004)
11）Workforce and Social Insurance (Jaminan Sosial dan Tenaga Kerja)
12）Indonesia Health Insurance for the Poor
13）Except in Aceh province where the provincial government recently introduced a province-
wide health security scheme called Jaminan Kesehatan Aceh (JKA).
14）Badan Layanan Umum (Public Service Agency). See Government Regulation of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 23 /2005 on the Financial Management of Public Service 
Agencies.
15）Since 1993 Indonesia has gradually developed an extensive medical insurance system. A 
compulsory health insurance scheme is introduced for all workers, with contribution paid 
entirely by employers. However, the coverage is restricted to civil servants and formal sector 
workers. Most private sector employees rely on private insurance schemes paid for by 
employers or themselves. Jamsostek, a state-owned company, which operates based on the 
Labor Social Protection Law, only provides health insurance for formal private sector 
workers (World Bank, 2008). 
16）See Wiener, Mitchell, Siti Budi Wardhani, and Michiel Van der Auwera (2007)
17）Dinna Wisnu, “Are we ready for a national social security system?”, The Jakarta Post, May 4, 2010.
18）Dinna Wisnu, “Hoping for social security in Indonesia”, The Jakarta Post, Saturday, May 22, 2010.
19）One way of building social security is through taxes (see Dina Indrasafitri, “RI a welfare 
state? It’s still a long way to go” The Jakarta Post, Jakarta May 22, 2010).
